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Summary:
The design problem for decentralized public good provision is outlined,
hypothesized to be incomplete as specified in the literature. Experimental
evidence is presented which supports the sensitivity of allocations to the
process, or informational logic, which is employed in public good decision-
reaching .
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A traditional view in economics has held the free-rider problem to
be an insurmountable barrier to the Pareto-efficient provision of public
goods via voluntary, decentralized decisionmaking. When announced volun-
tary cost shares are collected as a means of obtaining resources for
public good production, individuals face a conflict between correctly
revealing marginal evaluations and obtaining a low share of public pro-
duction cost.
An alternative, less pessimistic viewpoint arises in the recent
literature on allocation mechanisms. Viewing decentralized decision-
making as a design problem, various authors have constructed mechanisms
which can achieve Pareto-efficient allocations as Nash equilibria.
This paper presents experimental evidence suggesting that the de-
sign problem is incompletely specified in the theoretical literature.
Section 1 outlines the design problem and defines the major element
which is unspecified in theoretical analyses, the process, an informa-
tional logic by which an allocative decision is reached. Section 2
reviews Vernon Smith's experiments and introduces the Seriatim process,
an alternative to the process used by Smith. Experimental procedures
are related in Section 3, and results reported in Section 4. A discus-
sion section concludes the paper.
I. The Design Problem
Let e = {1,2, ...,i, .. .,1} be the set of economic agents who will
consume some allocation y G Y, a set of feasible allocations. While more
2generality is possible, it is convenient to presume y = (yn ,y, , .. . »yT ),
where y is the quantity of a pure public good, and y. a private alloca-
tion to agent i. Each agent i has a utility function u. e U, a space
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of utility functions. We denote u = (u., , ...,u
T )
e U , where u is
called a utility profile, and the space of utility profiles is the I-fold
product of U. An economic environment (u,Y) is described when preferences
and possibilities are specified.
A performance function g(»):U -+Y selects allocations satisfying per-
formance criteria given preferences. The usual performance function is
the Paretian, which, given any utility profile, picks out Pareto-efficient
allocations from Y. If preferences are known and the designer controls
allocations, he satisfies these performance criteria by directly allocat-
ing in accordance with g(u).
It is extreme, however, to model the designer as capable of directly
observing u. Typically, the designer observes only messages sent by
agents, modelled as choice of i. 6 M, a space of feasible messages.
Again, let m = (m.
,
. . . ,nO •= M be a message profile. Now the designer
specifies an outcome function f(«):M -+Y, where the allocation resulting
is dependent upon observed messages, not unobservable preferences. The
designer's choice then, is of a feasible message space, M, and an out-
come function, f, together called an allocation mechanism, D = (M,f).
The messages sent by agents depend upon the mechanism D being em-
ployed, and upon what messages other agents send. This dependence is
summarized by a joint behavior rule, e(»,D):U -*M
,
predicting a message
profile given a utility profile. The standard e(«,D) is Nash equilibrium
behavior.
The design problem: to find an allocation mechanism D* such that
for a given joint behavior rule e(«,D*), the performance function is
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decentralized by the mechanism. That is, find a D* satisfying
g(u) = f*[e(u,D*)] for any u 6 U 1 .
Groves and Ledyard [1977] have the seminal positive result on this
problem, constructing a solution when the joint behavior is Nash equil-
ibrium.
However, specifying the mechanism may not be sufficient to predict
joint behavior given the utility profile. In particular, it is con-
ceivable that joint behavior may also depend upon what we call the
process.
Definition: A process is a formal informational logic of decision
reaching which specifies: 1) a starting rule, including a determination
of the degree of information initially processed by each agent; 2) a
continuance rule which determines the timing of message relay or recon-
sideration, and of additional information transmitted to each player;
and 3) a stopping rule which ordinarily consists of an operational defi-
nition of agreement outcome and institution, and a default outcome to
be instituted if agreement is not reached within some unambiguously
measurable time horizon.
Since to some extent the process employed may affect an agent's per-
ception of the possibility, profitability, or strategic viability of
messages, the process may be hypothesized to affect joint behavior result-
ing from a given mechanism. Experimental data below afford a preliminary
test of this hypothesis.
It seems appropriate to consider the role of a process, if this
hypothesis is supported, to be an attempt to implement mechanisms. For-
mally, a mechanism may be said to be implemented by a process if the
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outcomes of joint behavior obtained by the mechanism-cum-process approx-
imately attain the performance standard (are approximately Pareto-
efficient)
.
II* Smith's Experiments
3Vernon Smith pioneered the experimental verification of economic
theory, and is principally responsible for the development of an experi-
mental economic methodology.
His initial public good experiments employed the Groves-Ledyard
mechanism (a partial equilibrium version called "optimal") and what we
choose to call the Smith process. Specifically,
Groves-Ledyard mechanism ; Player i=l,2,...,I chooses a message
n . 6 G C R , interpreted as an increment to public good production. De-
I
noting total public good production by T = Z n , the set of feasible
i=l 1
states is
F = {(n^...,!^) S GT \T G G}.
Let S = T - n. = I n . The "distribution of cost" function for i is
1 i iH j
ci(n
i'
s
i)
= [(q/I) " iycW + ^r1' Cni+Si)2 + ki
where q is per unit production cost, k a constant. This formula may
not be transparent, but has been designed to Groves-Ledyard to support,
in the Nash equilibrium sense, a Pareto-efficient message profile. The
outcome function, f, has component functions
f^n^Sj,) = V^T) - C^Cn^Sj), 1-1,..., I,
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where V (T) is the value in dollars to i of T units of the public
good.
Smith's public good experiments to date have all employed the same
process, which he has not found it necessary to name. As, to our knowl-
edge, it has no clear antecedents in the relevant literature, we choose
to call it the Smith process:
Smith process ; 1) Starting rule: in period t, each player inde-
pendently and privately selects a message m.(t). 2) Continuance rule:
a) all players are informed of m(t) , then the process proceeds to period
t+1; b) the complete stopping rule is known in advance by all players.
3) Stopping rule: a) the process stops in period t* if m (t*) m. (t*-l)
,
all i,m(t*) satisfies agreement and/or feasibility conditions, and
t* <_ T; in which case the outcome is f(m(t*)). b) otherwise the process
stops in period T (value of T prespecified) , and a prespecified default
outcome is instituted.
Smith's original experimentation examined the role of incentive com-
parability, by contrasting experiments with mechanisms for which there
is a Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium, with experiments using theoreti-
cally unsound mechanisms. His Groves-Ledyard mechanism experiments sup-
ported the hypothesis: if agreement is reached, the proposed public
good quantity will be Pareto-efficient. Experiments with a Lindahl mech-
anism, a specification in mechanism form of the logic of the Lindahl
[ 1919 ] approach, supported the hypothesis: if agreement is reached,
the allocation reached can be Pareto-dominated by another allocation
with a greater quantity of the public good.
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Additionally, Smith has constructed partial equilibrium and general
equilibrium versions of an Auction mechanism for public goods, which are
incentive-compatible. The former experimentally approximates Lindahl
equilibrium outcomes, while the latter reaches Pareto-efficient outcomes,
but with the "wealthy" overcontributing and the "poor" undercontributing
relative to Lindahl contributions.
These results lend strong support to the belief that public good
allocations are sensitive to the incentive-compatibility properties of
the mechanism being employed. To determine whether allocations are also
sensitive to the process employed, in particular, to see if the Groves-
Ledyard mechanism may be implementable by some processes but not others,
we introduce an alternative called the Seriatim process.
Seriatim process ; 1) Starting rule: each player i chooses initial
message m (0) in period 0.
2) Continuance rule: in period t, only player j = t mod I
(I = # players) reconsiders his message, all others automatically re-
peated. (That is, only player 2, for example, reconsiders his message
in period 2, all other players are inactive. If there are 5 players,
the process recycles in period 6, with only player 3 active in period
8.) Before the choice in period t, the player is informed of the cur-
rent messages of all other players, or the aggregate of current mes-
sages, if that is all that is relevant.
3) Stopping rule: a) If, in any I consecutive periods, each player
chooses to repeat his previously chosen message, agreement is reached,
and the associated outcome is instituted. This aspect of the stopping
rule is known in advance, b) If agreement is not reached within T
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periods, the default outcome is instituted. This aspect of the stopping
rule is not announced before it is instituted.
III. Experimental Procedures
We conducted six experiments in Evanston and Urbana using an experi-
mental design very similar to that of Smith [1979], but employing the
Seriatim process. An unannounced limit of 80 iterations was imposed.
Each experiment used three subjects, given evaluations of the public
good as shown in Table 1, and instructions including cost and net value
tables (as shown in Appendix I) . The public good was produceable in
facility sizes of 0,1,..., 11 at a unit cost of 36.
Cash payments were used to induce valuations of the abstract public
good upon subjects. The theory of induced valuation is developed in
Smith [1976]. Most subjects were students, with about a half dozen
other occupations represented; no subject had economics training beyond
a principles class.
Subjects read the instructions privately (except for the first ex-
periment where the subjects commented that reading the instructions aloud
was distracting), and any questions were answered, unless they related
to behavioral issues or experimenter perceptions. Subjects were paid $2
cash at the beginning of the experiment, and placed in separate rooms
for the duration of the session. At each turn t, the monitor opened the
door of the active player's room and informed her/him of the current
value of S, and withdrew. When the player had chosen a value for n,
the monitor recorded the choice on scrap paper and left, closing the
door.
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Table 1: Valuation Functions
V
1
V
2
v
3
1 22 23 31
2 42 42 50
3 61 55 61
4 79 67 69
5 93 78 74
6 105 87 78
7 112 92 81
8 116 95 82
9 118 96 82
10 118 96 82
11 118 96 82
T: Facility size
V1 : Total value (in $) of T units to player i.
(Each player saw only his own column.)
IV. Experimental Results
The six experiments were conducted in accordance with the procedures
outlined above. Results obtained are summarized in Table 2. The first
row of Table 2 indicates the outcome which would be the Pareto-efficient
Nash equilibrium (unique, in this experimental economy), and the next
six rows report the outcomes actually observed.
Column 1 reports the number of iterations in each experiment. The
next three columns present the final bids of the three subjects, where
a bid (n) is a proposed addition to facility size. The final facility
size, T, is the sum of proposed additions, shown in column 5. Columns
6-8 report subject earnings (excluding initial $2). Efficiency figures
shown provide the total consumer surplus achieved by all three subjects
at the agreed-upon facility size as a percentage of total consumer sur-
4
plus achievable at the Nash equilibrium allocation ($71)
.
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Table 2: Experimental Results
# of
iter.
Subj ect12 3
n n n
Facility
size
T
1
$
Subject
2 3
$ $ Efficiency
NE 3 1 4 18 18 18
#1 13 4 4 8 43 10 79 7%
#2 12 3 1 4 18 18 18 100%
in 23 3 2 5 29 17 29 92%
H 79 2 none 0%
#5 77 3 3 6 42 12 43 76%
H 28 2 1 3 6 60 48 -11 76%
Experiment #4 failed to reach agreement within the allowed (but un-
mentioned) 80 iterations. Experiment #2 was the only experiment at-
taining the Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium allocation. All others
ended at an allocation which was not a Nash equilibrium, and which con-
stituted overproduction of the public good.
After experiment #1, the subjects expressed some surprise that we
actually were going to pay them the dollar amount of their earnings.
(It appears to be a well-known practice of psychologists at both
Illinois and Northwestern to deceive experimental subjects about the
amount of money they can earn.) In the remaining experiments, we at-
tempted to counteract this tendency by carefully flashing a large roll
of bills when the initial $2 was given to each subject.
Outcomes in experiments #4 and #6 clearly resulted from atypical
behavior on the part of the subject 3 in each. Their exhibited behavior
may not be replicable with any frequency in a large number of trials.
-10-
Subject choices over all iterations are classified in Table 3, and
in Table 4 for a truncated set of iterations. The classification scheme
is that introduced by Ledyard [1978], to examine the question of whether
behavior by subjects in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism, Smith process ex-
periments (Smith, 1979 ) can be explained as a Cournot reaction to the
previous messages of the other agents.
In both Tables 3 and 4, the columns denote experiments #l-#6. Row 1
gives the frequency (number of behavioral choices over the total number
of choices or iterations) of Cournot behavior (C) , which is the selection
of that bid which maximizes earnings given the current bids of all other
subjects. Row 2 (R) shows the frequency with which subjects repeated
their most recently chosen bid. Row 3 (C & R) is the intersection of C
and R, the frequency with which repeat bids that were Cournot occurred.
Row 4 indicates the relative occurrence of Partial Cournot (PC) bids,
which are bids intermediate between the repeating bid and the Cournot
bid. In addition to Ledyard' s categorizations, we have compiled fre-
quencies for a strategy which might be called Satisficing (S) . Satis-
ficing here means (a) repeating the bid when the earnings associated
with this are at least 95% of the earnings associated with the Cournot
strategy (given the current bids of others), otherwise, (b) choosing
the Cournot bid. The final row (U) shows the frequency of bids unex-
plained by any of the strategies.
V. Discussion of Results
The substitution of the Seriatim process for the Smith process in
these experiments appears to introduce a tendency for public good over-
production, relative to Smith's experiments. To test this, we employ
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Table 3; Subject Behavior Over All Iterations
#1 n #3 H #5 #6
c 3/13 9/12 15/23 29/79 17/77 11/28
R 5/13 7/12 11/23 37/79 38/77 5/28
C&R 1/13 5/12 7/23 16/79 9/77 4/28
PC 4/13 0/12 0/23 10/79 10/77 7/28
S 5/13 10/12 20/23 42/79 29/77 16/28
U 2/13 1/12 4/23 19/79 21/77 9/28
Table 4: Subject Behavior Over A Truncated Set of Iterations
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6
c 3/7 4/6 13/17 26/73 15/71 8/22
R 2/7 3/6 6/17 33/73 33/71 2/22
C&R 1/7 2/6 6/17 14/73 8/71 2/22
PC 1/7 0/6 0/17 10/73 10/71 5/22
S 3/7 4/6 15/17 39/73 26/71 13/22
U 2/7 1/6 4/17 18/73 21/71 9/22
-12-
the statistic Q, the ratio of agreed-upon public good quantity to Pareto-
efficient Nash equilibrium public good quantity. Assuming that the ex-
perimental observations of the statistic Q in the two studies are drawn
from arbitrary probability distributions F and F,-, which are identical
b MM
save possibly for location, it is possible to test the null hypothesis
g
of identical location using the Wilcoxon two-sample test. The rank-
sum of Q,-CL, Q c , Q, from the results above is 38.5/55, statistically1 J J o
significant at p < .025. Thus, significant overproduction occurs for
the Groves-Ledyard mechanism, Seriatim process relative to the same
mechanism, Smith process.
This provides tentative support for the sensitivity-to-process hy-
pothesis of section 1 above. Specification of the mechanism alone is
insufficient to predict public good allocations in these experimental
economies. That the Nash equilibrium is less frequently attained with
the Seriatim process is somewhat surprising to us, especially since
the prior announcement of a maxlTimm number of periods (as in Smith's
experiments) would seem more supportive of non-Nash outcomes.
Ledyard [1978] calculates for Smith's experiments the percentage
of "explainable" bids (Cournot, Partial Cournot, or Repeat) which are
Cournot. For 5-subject experiments, this ratio is 41%, 47%, 50%, and
for 8-subject trials 32.5%, 33%. The corresponding statistics for ex-
periments 1-6 above are 27.3%, 81.8%, 78.9%, 48.3%, 30.4% and 57.9%,
respectively. The rank-sum for our experiments is 40/66, p < .268.
While Cournot behavior appears somewhat more frequently with the Seriatim
process, the difference is not so pronounced as to be statistically sig-
nificant independently of distributional parametrization.
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A similar rank sum test on frequency by subject of Cournot choices
rejects the null hypothesis that subject behavior in our experiments 2
and 3 is drawn from the same distribution as is our other four experi-
ments (p < .01). This raises the question of whether frequency of
Cournot behavior by subjects is related to Cournot bid frequency of
9the other subjects in the same experiment.
A non-parametric chi-squared cell frequency test rejects (p < .10)
the null hypothesis that individual frequency of Cournot choices is un-
corrected with Cournot choice frequency of the other two subjects.
Analogous rank-sum and chi-squared tests for frequency of satisficing
behavior were even more significant, rejecting the hypothesis that fre-
quency of subjects' satisficing bids is independent of others' satis-
ficing frequencies.
An important part of the explanation of public good overproduction
presumably comes from budget-balance considerations. Groves and Ledyard
point out that the version of their mechanism does not necessarily col-
lect cost shares equal in sum to production cost. We are not aware of
a reference to this in the literature, but the nature of the budgetary
surplus for all examples we have constructed is a monotonically (dramati-
cally so) decreasing function of the quantity of public good produced.
To induce valuations upon subjects and employ the mechanism, it is
necessary to pay subjects amounts summing to the total consumers' sur-
plus plus the budget deficit. This required us to pay substantially
more in the aggregate for production above the Nash equilibrium level.
Bid profiles which lead to overproduction always allow at least one
subject to gain through unilateral reduction, and usually involve one
-14-
player making less than at the Nash equilibrium. The budget deficit,
however, may be crucial to the observed overproduction. We have no in-
sight as to why the Seriatim process may lead the subjects to perceive
this opportunity more effectively than the Smith process.
Experiments with another version of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism
(the "Quadratic") are now in progress. They balance the budget, paying
out in sum the total consumer's surplus, and are general equilibrium
in the sense that income effects alter public good demand. These are
more complicated experiments requiring the aid of the PLATO computer
system.
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Footnotes
"This literature began in a diffuse fashion, but Hurwicz [1972],
Groves and Ledyard [1977], and Malinvand [1971] are major references.
Several recent works are in the "Symposium on Incentive Compatibility"
which is Volume 46(2), no. 143 of The Review of Economic Studies , April
1979. See Groves [1979] in that issue, or others, for more extensive
references.
2
This presentation of the design problem closely follows Groves
[1977].
3
Smith [1962] is the original private goods market experiment.
Smith [1979], originally a 1975 working paper, is the study reported
here. Smith also analyzed public good experiments. For an experimental
study of discrete public good experiments and references to antecedents,
see Ferejohn, Forsythe, Noll, and Palfrey [1979]. The development of an
experimental methodology for verification of allocatio theory is in
Smith [1976].
4
Subject earnings equalled the sum of consumers' surplus and the
budget deficit. A $17 budget surplus at the Nash equilibrium is built
into the cost share formulae.
A non-repeated choice at iteration 79 ended the experiment.
Subject 3 in experiment #4 appeared to derive utility from an un-
controlled phenomenon. He remarked at the beginning that he knew the
university did not allow experimenters to require a subject to pay
money in an experiment, and he may have derived satisfaction from
vicariously obtaining debts he was not obligated to pay. He chose bids
leading to large negative earnings (given bids of others) on 23 of 26
occasions, and repeated only once, on iteration 78.
Subject 3 in experiment #6 clearly did not understand the decision
procedure, despite a number of instances when clarification was directly
offered. She did not ask any questions. After the experiment we dis-
covered she had more than once entered on her session record an amount
of earnings which did not correspond to any of the possible earnings on
the session record. She had recorded her final earnings as $20 (rather
than the correct -$11)
.
Throughout the paper, our references to particular subjects assume
a random gender for pronouns.
Table 4 drops the first 3 iterations to reduce the impact of
early learning about the procedure, and the last 3 iterations, reflect-
ing the stopping rule requirement of repeated choices.
a
Hajek and Sidak [1967]. With the small sample sizes enforced
in experimental studies by cost consideration, it is inappropriate to
base statistical analysis upon any particular distributional assumptions.
Throughout, we restrict ourselves to nonparametric methods.
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9
Noncooperative game theory could predict this. If a strategy
is a mapping from the other players' current bids to your current bid,
your best strategy given the others' strategies will not in general
be the Cournot bid function unless their strategies are their Cournot
bid functions. It is not clear, however, how experimental subjects
could have discerned the strategies of the others.
Own Cournot frequencies and others' Cournot frequencies were
divided into above and below 40%. Chi-squared statistic was 3.6.
Cell division was by above and below 60% satisficing bids.
Chi-squared statistic was 5.5 (p < .025). The 40% and 60% dividing
lines have no particular import, and were selected to make expected
cell frequencies as reasonable as possible. The test statistic may
not be distributed approximately chi-squared if expected cell fre-
quencies are too low (Cochran [1954]).
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